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This paper evaluates the effectiveness of market-based approaches in the 
provision of public-sponsored training programs. In particular, we study 
the link between training quality and labor earnings using a Peruvian 
program that targets disadvantaged youths. Multiple proxies for training 
quality are identified from bidding processes in which public and private 
training institutions that operate for profit compete for limited public 
funding. Using difference-in-differences kernel matching and standard 
regression-based approaches, we find that beneficiaries attending high-
quality training courses have higher average and marginal treatment 
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males, and are larger in the medium term rather than in the short run. 
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1. Introduction  
Despite the fact that the empirical evidence on active labor policies suggests that 
training programs for youth and the displaced are not worth the cost, such programs keep 
being reinvented by policymakers. This has been particularly true in recent years when 
massive privatization processes and dramatic personnel reductions in overstaffed public 
sectors have driven a large fraction of workers into the unemployment ranks or the 
underground economy. In fact, public-sponsored training programs appear to yield small 
and even negative returns in both developed and developing countries (Heckman, 
Lalonde, and Smith, 1999; World Bank 2004). In this context, it is by no means clear 
whether training programs are ineffective because they target relatively unskilled and less 
able individuals or simply because of the quality of the training itself. After all, the same 
government agencies that get low grades in training assessments are the ones that end up 
in charge of implementing training programs.
1  
While a number of authors have reported gains in earnings associated to 
increments in school or college quality (e.g., Black and Smith, 2003, 2005; Dale and 
Krueger, 2002, Card and Krueger 1992), corresponding evidence for public-sponsored 
training programs is non-existent. In fact, the predominant approach in the literature is to 
assume either that training programs have an equal impact on all participants or 
systematic heterogeneity in the impact of these programs on earnings arises from 
individual differences in observed and unobserved characteristics (e.g., Bitler, Gelbach, 
and Hoynes, 2004). Yet training quality has not been incorporated formally in the 
evaluation of active labor market policies. Nor have the implications for public 
investment decisions of including training quality been explored.  
In this paper, we study the link between the quality of public-sponsored training 
programs and beneficiaries’ subsequent labor market earnings.  To our knowledge, this is 
the first paper that addresses quality issues in training programs, with the added 
advantage that we are able to address the role of market-based approaches in the 
provision of public-sponsored training services. In fact, the selection of training courses 
relies on formal bidding processes in which public and private training institutions 
                                                           
1For instance, Campa (1997) shows the limited ability of training programs to reallocate workers to 
alternative industries, partly because training was focused on the update of previous skills rather than the 
acquisition of new ones.    4
compete for limited public funding.
2 The detailed bidding questionnaires and instruments 
not only allow us to identify common proxies for quality such as expenditures per 
student, class size, infrastructure, equipment, and teacher characteristics, but they also 
provide information about curricular structure, such as the consistency of goals, contents, 
and activities. Moreover, this bidding information allows us to use disaggregated data at 
the course level, rather than at the school o state level, which may improve the 
explanation for quality heterogeneity (Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, and Rivkin, 2005). 
Furthermore, the availability of data for five different cohorts of individuals over an 
eight-year period (1996 to 2003) allows us to consider the robustness of our estimates 
with respect to the external validity assumption.  
This paper takes advantage of a non-experimental program, the Peruvian Youth 
Training Program (PROJOVEN), which has provided training to around 35,000 
disadvantaged young individuals aged 16 to 25 since 1996. The program has changed the 
government’s intervention in the training market from unconditional funding of public 
institutions to conditional cash transfers to public and private institutions that offer 
relative best quality courses at the best competing prices. The treatment consists of a mix 
of formal and on-the-job training organized into two sequential phases, at the training 
institution and at manufacturing or business firms for a period of six months. To 
guarantee a paid, on-the-job training experience for each trainee, the program follows a 
demand-driven approach in which competing institutions must offer training for those 
occupations with assured labor demand. Hence, this unique data design allows us to 
examine the effectiveness of market-based approaches in the selection of pertinent 
training services.  
The comparison group individuals are selected from a random sample of “nearest-
neighbor” households located in the same neighborhoods of those participants included in 
the evaluation sample. This costly evaluation design greatly ameliorates support 
problems in the data, which is one of the most important criteria needed for addressing 
bias due to selection on unobservables. Indeed, both the standardized quality scores based 
on bidding data and the unique evaluation framework allow us to minimize two crucial 
problems frequently encountered in the literature, data limitations and econometric 
                                                           
2Similar programs have been implemented since the mid-1990s in Chile (Chile Joven), Argentina (Proyecto 
Joven), Colombia (Youth Training Program), and Uruguay (Youth Training Program).    5
problems, and to provide alternative measures to typical point estimates which have been 
highly criticized (Glewwe and Kremer, 2005; Glewwe, 2002). Furthermore, the 
evaluation framework allows us to identify and compare individuals in the treatment and 
comparison groups 6, 12, and 18 months after the program, which in turn allow us to test 
whether the effect of training-quality on labor earnings is constant over time. 
 The possibility that better students sort themselves into better training institutions 
is very limited in this program because eligible individuals enroll to the courses 
according on a first-come-first-served basis, and because there is a large variability in the 
quality of the training courses within training institutions. To the extent that 
socioeconomic variables and family background raise or lower earnings for all levels of 
training attainment, we control our estimates from differences in observables arising from 
demographic, socioeconomic, and parental variables. To control for potential bias arising 
from differences in unobserved characteristics, we implement difference-in-differences 
kernel matching methods, which allow for selection on time-invariant unobservables 
(Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). We also implement an alternative marginal 
matching estimator that assumes that sorting into different quality training courses arises 
from both observables and unobservables. An advantage of this estimator is that it only 
requires data for the treatment group and thus can be applied when no comparison group 
data are available (Behrman, Chen, and Todd, 2004).      
  Our empirical findings can be summarized in four conclusions. First, we find 
strong evidence about the effectiveness of market-based approaches in the provision of 
training services. In fact, the combination of bidding processes with demand-driven 
approaches, which ensures both quality and pertinence of the training courses yield larger 
overall point estimates than those reported in the literature. This result is particularly 
robust for females who show much higher treatment impacts than male participants.  
  Second, we find evidence of substantial heterogeneity in response to training 
quality. Our main result is anticipated in Figure 1, which depicts the beneficiaries’ 
earnings along a quality-index grid. In general, individuals attending high-quality training 
courses show much higher labor earnings than individuals attending low-quality courses. 
These earning differentials are larger in the medium-term than in the short-run, which is 
explained by a sharp decrease in the medium-term earnings of individuals attending low-
quality courses. Our difference-in-differences models estimate that the effect suggested   6
by Figure 1 corresponds to a differential of 32 percent in the earnings of beneficiaries 
attending high- and low-quality courses 18 months after the program.     
  Third, this paper also shows that individuals who complete both formal training 
and on-the-job training experience have much higher earnings than individuals who 
complete only formal training. In fact, the returns to formal training are modest and 
consistent with previous findings in the literature on training programs. The earning 
differentials between individuals attending high- and low-quality courses are, however, 
larger within the subsample of individuals who complete only the formal training. This 
result suggests that the second stage of the program, the on-the-job training experience, 
smooths productivity gains between people attending training courses of varying quality. 
Fourth, there is evidence of Ashenfelter’s dip in this program. Parametric estimators that 
are consistent when the model of program participation stipulates pre-program earnings 
dip show that our results are robust to alternative identifying assumptions.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the 
economics of training quality. In section 3 we provide an overview of the PROJOVEN 
program. We then discuss the measurement of training quality in section 4. In section 5 
we present the evaluation data. In section 6 we discuss the empirical strategy along with 
the identification assumptions. Our main results appear in section 7. In section 8 we show 
some robustness tests, and we conclude in section 9 
2. The Economics of Training Quality 
Since the seminal work of Becker (1962) and Mincer (1962), economists have 
acknowledged the role of training as a potential determinant of labor earnings. This 
association may be due to human capital accumulation as trained individuals are more 
productive and, as a result, obtain higher earnings.
3 Numerous papers using a variety of 
data sources and econometric approaches have confirmed the main prediction that on-the-
job training and earnings are positively correlated (see Parsons 1986 for extensive review 
of literature). 
  To gauge the impact of training on earnings, the conventional “quantitative only” 
approach is to specify an earnings equation, augmented with training measures. The 
                                                           
3 Alternatively, since the cost of acquiring training is lower for high-ability individuals, even if training is 
unproductive, firms may make inferences about productive differences from training choices and workers 
respond by selecting longer training to signal higher quality. For our purposes, both models yield similar 
empirical predictions.    7
theoretical foundation for this approach assumes that the labor earnings of trainees would 
not equal their opportunity marginal product but would be less for the total cost of 
training, there is no risk aversion, and the post training work span is fixed at N and is 
independent of training. Thus, the equilibrium condition of equating the present 
discounted value of two income streams associated with training (Y1) and no training (Y0) 
can be written as 
'
10 ln ln YY X T β δε =++ +    (1) 
where X is a set of observed covariates such as schooling, experience, and age, T is a 
training measure, and ε  is the stochastic term. Figure 2A illustrates the basic effect of 
training. Trained persons would received lower earnings during the investment training 
period because the training is paid for at the time, and higher earning are collected after 
training because of the returns to the investment. This earnings profile (TT) is concave as 
long as the effect of training on earnings is higher in the short-run than in the medium-
term. On the contrary, we assume that untrained individuals receive the same earnings 
before and after the training (NN), being the difference between TT and NN greater the 
greater the cost of investment and the return from investment (Becker 1993).   
  To incorporate training quality on this conventional framework, we need two 
additional assumptions: 1) training quality varies across courses or programs; and 2) 
individuals do not sort into courses or programs in response to the training quality. These 
assumptions are similar to the statements done in the school quality literature (e.g.; 
Behrman and Birdsall 1983). The first assumption is necessary to obtain empirical 
estimates since the effect of training quality is only identified if quality is not 
homogenous. The second assumption is also needed to guarantee that individuals with 
lower private cost of learning do not select into high-quality courses or programs.
4 In the 
context of the PROJOVEN program, there is no question about the heterogeneity of the 
training services since we observe and measure large variability across training courses. 
The second assumption is more challenging since we cannot observe the level of ability 
for trainees. Because the enrollment into the courses is based on a first-come-first-served 
                                                           
4 If individuals with lower cost of training tend to have higher level of earnings regardless of their training 
choice, then the estimated marginal productivity will be upward-biased as an estimate of the true marginal 
productivity.    8
basis and because there is large variability in the quality of the training services within 
training institutions, we argue that this assumption is likely to be satisfied.  
  Figure 2B shows how the introduction of training quality alters the conventional 
framework. Holding fixed the quantity of training, the labor earnings are now conditional 
on the level of training quality ( 321 qqq >> ). Thus, the returns to training investment are 
higher for higher quality and thus the difference between the earnings profile for 
untrained and trained individuals will be grater the greater the quality. Put differently, 
higher training quality increases the slope of the observed relationship between earnings 
and training. Moreover, the concavity of the earnings profile may be more or less 
pronounced depending on whether the effect of the level of training quality on the future 
stream of earnings will depreciate faster or not.               
  To illustrate formally the relationship between earnings and training quality, we 
need to modify the earnings equation (1) to: 
'* *
10 ln ln ( , ) YY X T T Q β δμ =++ +    (1’) 
where T*(T,Q) represents the effective level of training and depends positively on both 
the extend and the quality of training; and μ is the new stochastic term. Because the 
underlying relationship between earnings and the effective level of training is unknown, 
one can assume a variety of functional forms for the smooth continuous function T*(.), 
including splines and polynomials on Q.
5  
By looking at equations (1) and (1’) it is obvious that if the true relationship is 
(1’) but one estimate the equation (1) the resulting least squared estimates of the returns 
to training will be biased. In the context of public-sponsored training programs, the 
identification of the quality effects gets even more complicated since the programs target 
unskilled individuals who self-select into training. Thus, the correlation between the 
effective level of training and the stochastic errors in the regressions will yield biased 
estimates. To eliminate bias we can relax the linear assumption in the earnings equation 
and implement more complex econometric estimators such as difference-in-differences 
                                                           
5 For instance, Heckman, Layne-Ferrar, and Todd (1995) find that estimated earnings-quality relationships 
for schooling quality are sensitive to specification of the earnings function. When false linearity 
assumptions are relaxed, the only effect of measured schooling quality is the earnings returns for college 
graduates.  
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matching (Heckman et al 1997), which is based on time-invariant identifying 
assumptions. 
3. The PROJOVEN Program 
To smooth the short-run negative effects of structural reforms on the welfare of 
poor households in Latin American during the mid-1990s, several countries launched 
active labor-market policies. In particular, the disproportionately large unemployment 
rates for young individuals galvanized governments to implement training programs 
across the region (ILO, 2003). The most distinctive element differentiating this 
generation of training programs from previous public-sponsored experiences was the 
decentralization of the training services through market mechanisms in which public and 
private training institutions compete for public funding (World Bank 2004). The 
competition was intended to reverse a long period of neglect of the quality of training in 
public institutions and, thus, to increase the returns to training. The assignment of public 
funds to any training institution, private or public, is similar in spirit to the school 
vouchers approach, which is motivated by the idea that competition will be translated into 
expanded access and enhanced service quality, and thereby improved labor market 
outcomes (see Carnoy 2001 for review of school vouchers literature). 
The Youth Training Program PROJOVEN was implemented in 1995 with the 
goal of increasing the employability and productivity of disadvantaged young individuals 
aged 16 to 25 through job-specific training in blue-collar occupations.
6 The treatment 
consists of a mix of formal and on-the-job training organized into two sequential phases. 
The first stage consists of 300 hours of classes at the training center locations roughly 
five hours per day for three months. In the second phase, training institutions must place 
trainees into a paid, on-the-job training experience in private manufacturing firms for an 
additional period of three months. 
The selection of the training courses relies on bidding processes that targets the 
relatively best training courses at the best competing prices. Thus, private and public 
training institutions that operate for profit compete for limited public funding following 
standard processes and strict timetables. To ensure the relevance of the training courses, 
                                                           
6These occupations are, for example, maintenance mechanic, electricians, janitors and building cleaners, 
cashiers, receptionist clerks, construction laborers, plumbers, pipefitters, maintenance and repair workers, 
sewing machine operators, textile operators and tenders, and computer operators.   10
the program relies on a demand-driven mechanism that stipulates that all training centers 
must present, as part of their offers, formal agreements with private manufacturing firms 
that guarantee a paid, on-the-job training for each beneficiary. This program design 
requires a strong match between the content of the training courses and the firm’s labor 
skill requirements and thus a strict coordination between the training institutions and the 
manufacturing firms in designing and implementing the training courses. As a result, the 
coverage of this training program is limited because of its costly design and relatively 
intense package of services.    
If the firms receive unproductive workers, they are entitled by law to drop their 
labor contracts at any time. Responsibility for the completion of both phases of training 
falls solely on the training institutions. A system of conditional payments based on the 
training centers’ effectiveness in successfully completing the six-month course provides 
the incentives to train only for those occupations with assured labor demand.
7  
3.1 The Beneficiary Selection Process  
PROJOVEN’s selection process consists of several stages governed by different 
actors: target individuals, bureaucrats, and training centers. Figure 3 shows the dynamic 
of this process. The program awareness strategy (position A) constitutes the first formal 
effort to reach out to the target population and aims to inform potential participants about 
the program’s benefits and rules. This first filter focuses only on those neighborhoods 
with a high concentration of households below the poverty line. Those prospective 
participants attracted by the expected benefits and perceived opportunity costs of 
participation voluntarily show up in the registration centers (position B) where qualified 
personnel determine their eligibility status. A standardized targeting system based on five 
key observable variables (poverty status, age, schooling, labor market status, and pre-
treatment earnings) determines who is eligible and who is not. This process concludes 
when there are nearly twice as many eligible individuals as training slots.
8  
 A two-tiered monitoring and supervision process guarantees the reliability of the 
information given by the prospective applicants to determine their eligibility status. In 
                                                           
7 Payments are structured in per capita terms according to the following scheme: 100, 80, 60, and 30 
percent if completing both phases of the program, at least one month of on-the-job training, only formal 
training, and at least a month of formal training, respectively.  
8 The number of selected courses depends on the available training slots, which are determined ex-ante.   
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addition to focusing only on targeted poor districts, the program administrator makes 
house visits to those applicants who provided dubious or inconsistent information. 
Finally, a random sample of eligible and non-eligible individuals is subject to an ex-post 
visit, which allows the program administrator to detect misreported cases and improve 
the eligibility survey and instruments.   
The applicant’s eligibility status does not guarantee participation in the program. 
Program enrollment depends on both training centers’ and applicants’ willingness to 
pursue the application process to its conclusion. Eligible individuals are invited to an 
orientation process (position C), where they choose the courses they want to attend 
following a first-come-first-served criterion. This process concludes when the number of 
eligible individuals exceeds by 75 percent the number of available slots in each course.  
Finally, the training institutions select beneficiaries from the pool of eligible 
applicants selected by the program administrator (position D). This final step does not 
follow standardized criteria since each institution applies its own rules. Because the 
eligible-beneficiary ratio is around 1.75:1, the training centers have a limited role in 
selecting beneficiaries.  
4. Measuring Training Quality  
The selection of training services follows a two-step standardized process. The 
first step targets the selection of training institutions. The program operator consults a 
training directory called the RECAP, which lists all the training institutions eligible to 
participate in the program. To be included in the RECAP, the training centers must pass a 
minimum quality threshold after the program administrator verifies their legal status 
(formality) and the existence of some acceptable level of human resources and 
infrastructure. In this first step, institutions do not compete with each other, there are no 
restrictions as to the number of institutions that can be listed in the RECAP, and the 
quality threshold is loosely determined.
9 
  In the second step, the program administrator invites institutions included in the 
RECAP to participate in public bidding processes in which the selection of training 
courses rather than training institutions takes place. The PROJOVEN’s Terms and 
Conditions regulate these processes and follow a set of international standards that were 
                                                           
9For those training centers that participate in two or more consecutive programs, the previous performance 
is also considered as an additional evaluation factor. It explains almost half of the total score.   12
previously approved by the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations as 
part of their role of guarantors in this program. This document stipulate, for instance, the 
starting and closing dates for the bidding, the schedule of the payments, and potential 
conflict of interest; and the technical specifications for the courses including the selection 
of the trainees, the minimum and maximum number of students per class, the duration of 
the courses, the core activities, etc.
10  
This formal document also includes standardized forms and instruments that must 
be presented at the bidding. They are constructed by education specialists with the 
express purpose of extracting both quantitative (e.g., number of computers, number of 
instructors, etc), and qualitative information (e.g., curricula, activities, etc) about each 
competing course. Once the deadline is reached, two sealed envelopes containing the 
technical specifications and price offers are open in a public act, where the price offers 
are made public. The documents containing the technical specifications, on the other 
hand, are subject to blind evaluation during a two-month period or so. In this process, a 
small team of education specialists assigns standardized scores to multiple proxies for 
quality following a battery of standardized instruments. The score system is confidential 
and, therefore, unknown to the competing institutions.
11  
Three distinctive features characterize the quality measurement in this second 
step. First, all proxies for quality are disaggregated at the course level rather than at the 
school level, which allows us to measure the quality of the training services in great 
detail. Thus, variations can be found within training centers depending on the relative 
distribution of school supplies or differential teacher experience across courses. Second, 
detailed questionnaires and instruments not only target common proxies for quality such 
as expenditures per student, class size, infrastructure, and equipment, but also put 
emphasis on the curricular structure (i.e., consistency among goals, contents, and 
activities) and teacher “skills” (i.e., experience in dealing with disadvantaged young 
individuals). The inclusion of this new set of “soft” variables that defy an objective 
description may dramatically improve the explanation for differences in quality 
                                                           
10The PROJOVEN’s Terms and Conditions can be found at http://www.projoven.gob.pe. Both the Inter-
American Development Bank and the United Nations have played an important role in the transparency of 
these processes because their involvement in the funding and administration of the funds, respectively.      
11For instance, the variable that measures the quality of the equipment considers four different scores: 4 for 
very good quality, 3 for good quality, 2 for low quality, and 0 for very low quality.      13
(Hanushek, 1986). Third, the measurement of quality proxies follows a standardized 
system of scores rather than the classical approach of computing raw quantities (e.g., 
number of computers). In this way, the evaluators are able to evaluate both the number of 
items in each subcategory and their intrinsic quality. For example, in evaluating a course 
on computing software, the total score in the equipment variable will depend on both the 
quantity of computers per student and the model and age of the machines. The use of 
standardized scores also allows for the evaluation of variables such as curricular structure 
that do not per se have a corresponding quantitative content. Only two proxies for quality 
are measured in raw form: expenditures per student and class size.    
  This paper focuses on 6 different categories of proxies for quality: class size, 
expenditures per trainee, 8 teacher variables, 6 infrastructure and equipment physical 
characteristics, 19 curricular structure variables, and 9 variables characterizing the link 
between the content of the training courses and the institution’s knowledge about workers 
and occupational analysis of labor demand. As a whole, these variables largely exceed 
the number of school and teacher characteristics considered to be core variables in the 
literature (Fuller 1987; Harbison and Hanushek, 1992).  
Table 1 displays summary statistics of these quality measures using re-scaled 
indices for all categories. We use data from 1996 to 2003, which allows us to identify 
five different bidding processes corresponding to the first, second, fourth, sixth, and 
eighth programs. Two features emerge. First, there is variation in the scores assigned to 
each category within and across programs. In particular, expenditures per trainee and 
curricular structure are the variables that vary most between and within programs. On the 
other hand, infrastructure and equipment are the variables that show the smallest 
variation. Second, as one might expect, there is an increasing trend in the average quality 
for some proxies over time. This is explained by a natural learning curve on the part of 
continuously participating institutions, and by the relatively small number of new 
entering training institutions.
12       
Because we think that each individual quality proxy represents an error-ridden 
measure of underlying quality, we combine the information for all quality proxies using 
factor analytic methods to produce a one-dimensional quality index. In doing so, we use 
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the first principal component, which is a linear combination of the quality proxies that 
accounts for the highest proportion of their variance. The lower panel of Table 1 shows 
large variability in the resulting index within and across programs. We also include the 
number of competing training institutions, courses offered, and courses accepted for these 
five rounds of the program. The average number of training institutions is 33 per 
program, ranging from 30 to 48. These institutions offer an average of 200 courses per 
program. We also observe that the supply of training courses and the number of selected 
courses follow parallel paths. The ratio of funded courses to competing courses reaches 
0.59, which indicates a relatively high probability of success for those training 
institutions included in the RECAP.  
Two potential factors that may affect the accuracy with which the quality proxies 
are measured are evaluation bias and misreporting. In the first case, evaluators may 
introduce bias when assigning scores due to subjective evaluation. The program 
administrator, however, minimizes this risk by hiring a small team of education 
specialists who are trained to follow a standardized score system and are under strict 
supervision.
13 The competition for limited public resources may also encourage training 
centers to misreport their public offers. To minimize this problem, the program 
administrator has implemented a monitoring system that uses inspections before and 
during the training to ensure the validity of all technical specifications contained in the 
offers.  
The bidding data are then merged with the evaluation data, which implies that all 
treated individuals attending the same training course receive the same quality scores.  
5. The Evaluation Data  
 From 1996 to 2003, the period for which we currently have data, the PROJOVEN 
evaluation datasets consist of 10 different sub-samples associated with 5 different cohorts 
of beneficiaries receiving treatment in Lima, and 5 corresponding comparison group 
samples.
14 The beneficiary subsamples are selected from a stratified random sample of 
                                                           
13 For instance, the program administrator cannot assign any resulting contract without prior written 
approval from the United Nations or the Inter-American Development Bank.  
14 Individuals that satisfy the same eligibility criteria in terms of age, education, poverty status, and labor 
outcomes compose all five cohorts. The only difference among these groups is the period when they 
receive the treatment. These periods extend from November 1996 to April 1997; February 1998 to July 
1998; March 1999 to August 1999; June 2000 to December 2000; and August 2001 to January 2002, 
respectively.     15
the population of participants corresponding to the first, second, fourth, sixth, and eighth 
rounds of the programs.
15 Individuals in the corresponding comparison subsamples are 
selected from a random sample of “nearest-neighbor” households located in the same 
neighborhood as those participants included in the evaluation sample. The program 
operator builds the comparison samples by using the same eligibility instruments applied 
to the treatment sample and by pairing each beneficiary to a random neighbor who has 
the same sex, age, schooling, labor market status, and poverty status. The neighborhood 
dimension may have the ability to control some unobservables, including geographic 
segregation, transportation costs, and firms’ location, which may affect the propensity to 
work and the potential outcomes.   
For each treated and untreated cohort combination, we have panel data collected 
in 4 rounds including a baseline and 3 follow-up surveys taken 6, 12, and 18 months after 
the program. The baseline survey provides rich information for all variables that define 
the eligibility status. It also contains demographics and labor-market information. In fact, 
relevant factors affecting both the propensity to participate in the program and labor 
market outcomes are available. There is information, for example, on education 
attainment, marital status, number of children, parents’ schooling, and participation in 
welfare programs. The labor-market module includes information about labor force 
participation, experience, monthly earnings, working hours, occupation, firm’s size, and 
participation in previous training courses. At the household level, we have information 
about family size, family income, and household’s density rate. In addition, the datasets 
provide detailed information on dwelling characteristics including source of drinking 
water, toilet facilities, and house infrastructure (type of materials used in the floor, 
ceiling, and walls), which is used to measure the poverty status. Moreover, the follow-up 
surveys provide detailed labor-market information for both treated and comparison 
groups, using the same definitions and variables as the baseline instruments, which 
minimize potential biases due to misalignment in the measurement of variables.   
                                                           
15 The total number of participants in these program rounds is 1507, 1812, 2274, 2583, and 3114, 
respectively.  The corresponding number of treated individuals in the random sample is 299, 321, 343, 405, 
and 421.   16
5.1 Comparison of Pre-Treatment Sample Means 
  Table 3 compares the means of several covariates for the treatment and comparison 
samples for each one of five different cohorts. Column 2 shows the means using the 
pooled sample and columns 3 to 7 show the p-values for the test of difference of means 
for each cohort. In terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, Panel A 
shows the effectiveness of the “neighborhood” strategy to balance the distribution of 
covariates that determine the eligibility status. Both groups have the same average age 
(19), sex ratio (42 percent are males), and schooling attainment (85 percent have 
completed high school). The p-values for all cohorts under analysis do not reject the null 
hypothesis of equality of means. The data show, however, that both marital status and 
children variables have different distributions. About 90 percent of the participants are 
single and only 14 percent have children, which differs from the comparison sample, 
which has a lower proportion of single people (77 percent) and a higher proportion of 
individuals with offspring (25 percent). The p-values show that this is a robust result for 
all cohorts.   
  Panel B compares labor market characteristics for treatment and comparison 
samples. Both groups have the same proportion of individuals in and out of the labor 
force. Approximately 52, 25, and 22 percent of individuals were employed, unemployed, 
and out of the labor force, respectively. These non-significant differences are consistent 
across all cohorts as is shown by the p-values. The type of work depicts a somewhat 
different pattern. A higher proportion of comparison individuals were working in the 
formal private sector (63 versus 54 percent) whereas a higher proportion of treated 
individuals were non-paid family workers (17 versus 10 percent). A comparison of 
monthly earnings also shows that treated units receive on average smaller earnings than 
their counterpart comparison sample, which is a steady result across all cohorts.  
  Panel C compares households and dwelling characteristics. On average family 
income is somewhat smaller for treated individuals, although the p-values show mixed 
results across different cohorts. In addition, the analysis of dwelling characteristics shows 
that a higher proportion of treated individuals live in houses with somewhat better 
infrastructure and access to flush toilet and piped water. These differences, however, are 
not significant for several cohorts. Finally, Panel D shows parental schooling attainment. 
In general, the schooling distribution in both samples is similar, with mothers having   17
fewer years of formal education than their spouses. The p-values do not reject the null 
hypothesis of equality of means for most of the categories.  
In summary, the baseline datasets show that we are dealing with a homogenous 
population in terms of several socioeconomic and labor-market characteristics, including 
sex, age, schooling, parents’ education, type of work, previous training, and family size. 
On the other hand, the data also reveal some significant differences in variables such as 
marital status, presence of children, monthly earnings, family income, and some dwelling 
characteristics, which would play an important role in any econometric strategy intended 
to eliminate selection bias.   
6. The Empirical Strategy  
Let  1() Yq be the potential outcome in the treatment state (1 ) T =  for an individual 
who participated in a training course of quality q and let  0() Yg be the potential outcome 
in the untreated state ( 0) T = . In our application, the untreated state refers to either no 
participation in the program, in which case  0 g = , or participation in a training course of 
quality  g , where gq < . We observe the pairs  11 (() ,) YqT and  00 (( ) ,) YgT but never 
10 (() ,) YqT or  01 (( ) ,) YgT. Because of this missing data problem, we cannot identify for 
any particular individual the treatment gains  10 (() () ) i Yq Yg Δ =−. We focus, instead, on 
both average and marginal treatment impacts conditional on the quality of the training 
courses.  
Our parameter of interest is the impact of treatment on the treated, which 
estimates the mean effect of attending a high-quality training course rather than not 
participating (or attending a low-quality course) on the individuals who attend a high-
quality course: 
10 1 0 ( ( ) ( )| 1 ) ( ( )| 1 ) ( ( )| 1 ) TT EY q Y g T EY q T EY g T Δ= − == =− =.        (2) 
While  1 (() | 1 ) EY q T=  may be estimated from the observed treatment sample, the right-
hand side of the equation (2) contains the missing data 0 (( ) | 1 ) EY g T= . Using the 
outcomes of untreated individuals to approximate the missing counterfactual yield the 
well-known selection bias because of differences in the distribution of observed and 
unobserved characteristics between T=1 and T=0.    18
  To eliminate bias due to selection on unobservables, we implement matching 
methods to estimate the counterfactual outcome for program participants by taking 
weighted averages over the outcomes of observationally similar untreated individuals. 
Thus, we relax any linear assumption that may mask the earnings-quality relationship. 
We proceed under the assumption that the distribution of unobservables varies across 
T=1 and T=0  but not over time within groups, which is the standard assumption of 
difference-in-differences models.  
6.1 Identifying Mean Impacts when the Counterfactual is not Participation ( 0 g = )  
In general, standard matching methods eliminate selection bias by balancing the 
distribution of observables of the untreated group with that of the treated group. 
However, there may be systematic differences in T=1 and T=0 outcomes even after 
conditioning on a rich set of observables. Such differences may arise in the PROJOVEN 
program from three different sources. First, it is impossible to control differences in 
innate ability or motivation. Second, we do not observe all the factors that govern the 
transition from eligible status to beneficiary status. Third, we may not observe and 
measure certain aspects of teacher and school quality correlated with the quality index.  
To eliminate bias arising from unobservables, we can use difference-in-
differences matching methods (Heckman et al. 1997) that are conditional semiparametric 
versions of the widely used parametric approach. This method solves the evaluation 
problem by subtracting the before-after change in untreated outcomes from the before-
after change for treatment outcomes. The identifying assumption justifying this matching 
estimator is that there exists a set of conditioning variables X such that  
'' (() () | , 1 ) (() () | , 0 ) tt tt EY q Y g XT EY g Y g XT −= = −= . (3) 
where  t’ and t refer to before and after the start of the program and  0 g = . This 
assumption ensures that after conditioning on a rich set of observable variables, the 
outcomes for treated and untreated individuals follow a parallel path.  
  Matching methods force us to compare comparable individuals by relying on the 
common support assumption  
         Pr( 1| ) 1 TX =<  for all X.                (4) 
The support condition ensures that for each X satisfying assumption (3) there is a positive 
probability of finding a match for each treatment individual. Otherwise, if there are X for   19
which everyone received treatment, then it is not possible for matching to construct the 
counterfactual outcomes for these individuals. In this sense, matching forces us to 
compare comparable individuals in a way that standard regression methods do not. 
Under conditions (3) and (4), we estimate the treatment impacts by computing 
first the counterfactual outcome for each treatment unit using a weighted average of the 
comparison units’ outcomes over the common support region, and then averaging these 
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where  1 n and  0 n  are the sample of treatment and comparison individuals, Sp is an 
indicator function that takes the value 1 for individuals in the common support region (0 
otherwise) and  ( ) Wij −     is the key weighting function that depends on the Euclidian 
distance between each comparison group individual and the treatment group individual 
for which the counterfactual is being constructed. We estimate the counterfactual 
outcome  ' (, ) [( 0 ) ( 0 ) ] tt Wi jY Y − ∑     using local linear regression methods that were 
developed in the early 1990s by Fan (1992) and have more recently been considered in 
the evaluation literature by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998). This 
nonparametric approach relies on standard kernel weighting functions that assign greater 
weight to individuals who are similar, and is more efficient than local constant regression 
methods because of its lower boundary bias in regions of sparse data.
16   
6.2 Identifying Marginal Program Impacts () gq <  
  We are also interested in the marginal treatment impacts of increasing quality in 
the program from  g  to q, where g >0, using data on program participants who have 
received different qualities of treatment. An important advantage of using only treatment 
individuals is that we do not require assumptions about the process governing selection 
into the program. On the other hand, this approach may introduce a potential source of 
nonrandom selection because of potential sorting. Indeed, this is the main econometric 
                                                           
16The local constant regression presents bias inversely proportional to the density distribution of the 
untreated sample. This feature may be problematic because typically the mass of the treated individuals is 
located in regions where the number of untreated ones is sparse.   20
problem in studies addressing the link between college quality and labor earnings (e.g., 
Black and Smith, 2005).   
  Three features limit the chances that high-ability individuals select into high-
quality courses in the PROJOVEN program. First, eligible individuals choose the course 
they want to attend on a first-come-first- served basis, which is not the case in studies 
addressing college education. Second, there is large variability in the quality of the 
training courses within training institutions.
17 Thus, even if more able individuals manage 
to get in line ahead of less able individuals and select the training centers where they 
would like to go, they may end up enrolled in low-quality courses. Third, there is no 
evidence that training institutions use any sort of IQ tests to select the program’s 
beneficiaries among the eligible population. From interviews with both the program 
operator and training institution personnel, it seems that the selection of beneficiaries 
among the eligible individuals is driven by variables such as marital status, children, and 
specific physical requirements arising from the courses (e.g., body mass for handling 
weights).
18 
  Because we cannot ignore sorting in our data, we again implement difference-in-
differences matching methods that assume selection in observables and unobservables to 
eliminate selection bias. Formally, the identifying condition (3) changes to 
1' 2' ( ( ) (0)| , 1) ( ( ) (0)| , 1) tt tt EY q Y XT EY q Y XT −= = −= .   (6) 
which states that the mean outcomes for individuals participating in high-quality courses 
follow a parallel path with respect to individuals attending low-quality courses. We 
estimate the marginal treatment impact using the same matching estimator (equation 5), 
although this is adjusted for the changes implied in assumption (6). This new estimator 
gives the impact of increasing the quality of the program from  1 q  to  2 q for the group of 
individuals who enrolled in the training course of quality 1 q , where  12 qq > .   
6.3 Empirical Issues  
Because the “curse of dimensionality” arises when X is high dimensional, we 
follow the celebrated result of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), who show that if the 
information set contained on X justifies matching, then matching on the balancing score 
                                                           
17The pooled data show that the standard deviation for the within-institution quality-index ranges from 0.10 
to 0.27 whereas the overall standard deviation is 0.18. 
18 It is against the program’s rules to select individuals based on age, race, sex, or schooling.    21
() bXis also justified. The balancing scores is a function of attributes at least as “fine” as 
the valued index that predicts the probability of participation: the propensity score.   
The proof that assumptions (3) and (6) hold for  ( ) PX  instead of X, is attained by 
a balancing property,  
(| 1 , () ) (| 0 , () ) (|() ) EXT PX EXT PX EX PX ====  
This is a non-trivial property because in general  ( ) ( ) mn PX PX ≈  does not 
imply mn X X ≈ , and hence,  ( ) ( ) mn EX EX ≠ .
19 As a result, we assume that equations (3) 
and (6) hold when we replace X  with  ( ) Pr( 1| ) PX T X = = . 
 In the empirical work, we estimate the propensity score using a probit approach 
and implement the balancing test suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (1999).
20 Table 3 
shows the probit results for all cohorts. As expected, the covariates used to construct the 
comparison samples (age, sex, schooling, and work status) are not significant predictors 
for program selection as they are balanced between treatment and comparison groups. In 
general, past earnings, experience, type of work, dwelling characteristics, mother’s 
education, family income, and family density rate are the most important predictors of 
participation in the PROJOVEN program. The estimates also show that married 
individuals and people with offspring are less likely to participate, although the 
coefficients are not significant for some cohorts. Furthermore, the distributions of the 
estimated propensity scores indicate no support problems in our data. Less than 5 percent 
of the observations are out of the empirical overlapping region, which illustrates the 
relative efficiency of constructing comparison groups among eligible “neighbor” 
individuals. In this respect, our data satisfy one of the most important criteria needed for 
solving the evaluation problem.
21  
                                                           
19 This is a key difference from covariate matching where  mn X X =  automatically implies 
() () mn EX EX = for treatment and comparison samples.   
20This test considers valid any parametric models that balance the distribution of pre-treatment covariates 
between matched individuals conditional on the propensity score. It is important to indicate, however, that 
multiple versions of the balancing test exist in the literature, and little is know about their statistical 
properties or the relative efficiency among them.   
21We follow the “trimming” method (Heckman et. al., 1998), which seems to be more stringent than 
alternative approaches suggested in the literature. Hence, we estimate the propensity score density 
distributions for T=1 and T=0 using Epanechnikov kernel functions. Then, the estimated densities are 
evaluated at all observed data points and, all points with zero density and points corresponding to the 
lowest 2 percent of estimated density values are trimmed.   22
  To implement the local linear kernel matching (equation 6) we also need to 
compute kernel functions along with their optimal bandwidths. We adopt the unbounded 
Epanechnikov kernel and choose bandwidth values by weighted least squares cross-
validation, which selects the value that minimizes the mean square error of the local 
linear regression estimator over a bandwidth search grid.
22 The weights account for the 
location of the treated units because precise estimation of counterfactuals is more 
important in regions containing much of the probability mass of the treatment group 
individuals than in regions where few treated individuals are located (Black, Galdo, and 
Smith, 2006).
 23    
7. Matching Estimates 
  Table 4 presents matching estimates applied separately to each one of five 
different cohorts. Each column refers to one cohort, and the last column shows the pooled 
data estimates. The upper panel (A) depicts short-run treatment impacts whereas the 
lower panels (B and C) present medium-term impacts. Within each panel, three different 
parameters of interest are presented: the average treatment effect on the treated, the 
average treatment effect on those attending a high-quality course, and the average 
treatment effect on those attending a low-quality course. In all three cases, we estimate 
the counterfactuals using the comparison group sample. The point estimates for the 
treatment impacts are presented along with their corresponding bootstrap standard errors 
(in parentheses) and percentage gains (in brackets), which are calculated using the mean 
earnings in the baseline period.    
   By looking at the first row of each panel, one can observe that the PROJOVEN 
program is an effective, active labor-market initiative, as was previously shown in partial 
evaluations of the program.
24 The overall treatment impacts on the treated are S./ 67 soles 
6 months after the program, S./ 49 soles 12 months after the program, and S./ 44 soles 18 
months after the program.
25 Compared with the mean pre-treatment earnings, these 
numbers show large increments (59, 43, and 39 percent, respectively), although they 
represent only about one-third to one-fourth of the Peruvian monthly minimum wage in 
                                                           
22The bandwidth grid is defined over values 0.8 through 8 for the logs odd ratio, with a step size of 0.1. 
23Relative to their frequency in a random population, the treatment group individuals are oversampled. 
Thus, we apply matching methods to choice-based sampled data and thus we use the log of the odd ratio 
ˆˆ () / 1 () PX PX − as the matching variable. 
24Galdo (1998), Ñopo, Saavedra, and Robles (2001), Chacaltana and Sulmont (2002).    
25The exchange rate between soles and U.S dollars is about 3:1 for the period under analysis.    23
the period of analysis. These statistical significant gains are mainly explained by the large 
number of individuals that relocated from unproductive jobs toward productive ones in 
private firms protected by international labor-standard laws. For example, the percentage 
of beneficiaries working as either unpaid family workers or housekeepers decreases from 
31 to 6 percent 12 months after the program. The results also indicate a downward trend 
in the evolution of the gains over time, which is consistent with theoretical predictions 
emerging from human capital models (Becker, 1993). 
The second and third rows within each panel show the average treatment impacts 
for those attending high- and low-quality training courses. In general, the matching 
estimates indicate that trainees attending high-quality courses have higher labor-market 
earnings than those trainees attending low-quality courses after controlling for systematic 
differences in observed and unobserved covariates. By looking at the pooled sample 
estimates, we observe that 6 months after the program the differential effect between high 
and low-quality courses reaches 10 percentage points, and increases to 19 and 36 
percentage points 12 and 18 months after the program. These results suggest that the 
earnings gap between individuals attending high- and low-quality courses increases over 
time, which is mainly explained by a sharp decrease in the medium-term earnings of 
those beneficiaries attending low-quality courses.
26  
   Table 5 presents the marginal matching estimates in parallel format to Table 4.
27 
Thus, we show short-run (upper panel) and medium-term (lower panels) treatment 
impacts for each cohort (columns 2 to 5) and the pooled data (column 6). Within each 
panel, we present two marginal treatment impacts: the effect of increasing the quality of 
the training services from  1 q  (lowest quartile) to  4 q  (top quartile), and the effect of 
increasing quality from  3 q  (quartile 3) to  4 q  (top quartile). Two main patterns emerge. 
  First, the marginal impacts indicate mostly positive treatment impacts for those 
attending high-quality courses, although we lose statistical significance due to sample 
                                                           
26 The estimates emerging 6 and 12 months after the program are estimated without considering attrition in 
the data because of the marginal number of missing individuals (4 percent). A potential problem emerges, 
however, when comparing these estimates with those emerging 18 months after the program because the 
lack of information for the last cohort. For this reason, we re-estimate the impacts 6 and 12 months after the 
program without including the last cohort. None of the empirical implications of the paper changes and, 
therefore, we only provide the first set of estimates.              
27We match on the predicted probability of attending s high-quality training course (top quartile) using the 
same set of regressors as before. These propensity score models are not reported but they are available 
upon request.   24
size issues. As expected, these estimates are much smaller than the overall mean 
treatment impacts that emerge when the group of non-participants constitutes the 
counterfactual group. These marginal gains are not explained, however, for differences in 
the types of jobs hold for beneficiaries attending high- and low-quality courses. In fact, 
the percentage of beneficiaries who hold unproductive jobs is similar between these two 
groups before and after the program. This may suggest that some productivity-enhancing 
effects explain these earnings differentials.  
Second, the marginal impacts are consistent with our previous findings about the 
increasing trend of the returns to training quality over time. For instance, the estimates 
from the pooled sample reveal that the effect of increasing quality from  1 q  to  4 q  changes 
from 18 to 32 percent when one moves from 6 to 18 months after the program.  
  When the estimates from Tables 4 and 5 are taken together, three important 
lessons emerge. First, market-based approaches that put great emphasis in the quality and 
pertinence of the training courses yield larger overall point estimates than those reported 
in the literature. This intensive and costly program has the ability to relocate workers 
from unproductive jobs toward productive ones in firms protected by international laws 
that guarantee minimum work conditions.
28 In addition, these average gains are 
heightened by the fact that the per-capita expenditures on participants are not small 
relative to the deficits that this program is being asked to address.
29  
Second, reporting simple average treatment impacts hide important distributional 
gains due to heterogeneity in the quality of the training services even within a selected 
group of institutions that pass a quality threshold. This result suggests that the earnings 
gap between high- and low-quality courses would be higher if the program administrator 
allowed the participation of training institutions located below the cut-off point. Finally, 
this study highlights the importance of having multiple cohorts of participants for the 
                                                           
28We also illustrate this fact by estimating conditional probabilistic models that use firms’ size as the 
dependent variable (1 if working in firms with more than 20 workers, 0 otherwise) and treatment status as 
the key independent variable for the pooled data. The estimates show that treatment group individuals are 
52 percent more likely to work in medium- and large-size firms than comparison group individuals 12 
months after the program. These estimates are statistically significant at 5 the percent level. It is important 
to note that the distribution of treated individuals across firm size is symmetric for individuals in the top 
and bottom quartiles of quality index.  
29Whereas the Peruvian public school system spent S./ 1,200 soles per-capita in 2001, the PROJOVEN 
program spends about S./ 2,600 soles per-capita.        25
same program design when assessing the effectiveness of active labor market programs. 
The sensitivity of some estimates to the sample used is very illustrative.   
8 Robustness Checks  
8.1 Ashenfelter’s Dip and Sensitivity to the Econometric Estimators  
The difference-in-differences approach may be sensitive to the specific period 
over which the ‘before” period is defined if we observe a drop in the mean earnings of 
participants prior to program entry (Ashenfelter 1978). Figure 4 depicts the earnings 
trajectory for the treatment and comparison groups. Three clear patterns emerge. Fist, 
there is some evidence about the existence of Ashenfelter’s Dip in the PROJOVEN 
program that may bias the estimates. Because of data limitations, we cannot argue 
whether the pre-program drop in earnings is permanent or transitory. However, evidence 
from employment patterns in the months prior to the program is more consistent with the 
hypothesis of transitory drops in earnings, which implies that our estimates may be 
upwardly biased. Second, the pre-program earnings dip is similar for individuals 
attending both high- and low-quality courses. Thus, our marginal treatment impacts may 
be unaffected by Ashenfelter’s dip. Third, the full post-program earnings trajectory is 
consistent with the point estimates emerging 6, 12, and 18 months after the program. In 
particular, individuals attending low-quality courses show the largest drop in earnings in 
the medium-term.  
Alternative econometric estimators that are consistent when the model of program 
participation stipulates pre-program earnings dip can address the issue about the 
robustness of our estimates. We use a standard regression-based estimator of the 
difference between the post-treatment earnings of treatment and comparison group 
members, holding constant the level of pre-treatment earnings and a set of control 
variables that includes the propensity score. This estimator identifies consistently the 
parameters of the regression model in the context of Ashenfelter’s dip (Lalonde 1986). In 
addition to the conditional covariates, we include dummy variables for having attended a 
course in the fourth, third, second, and first quartile of the quality distribution. The 
control group indicator is the omitted group and, therefore, the implicit counterfactual. 
The OLS analysis estimates the effect of a treatment under the assumptions of selection 
on observables and that simply conditioning linearly on X suffices to eliminate selection 
bias.       26
The results in Table 6 indicate that the difference-in-differences matching 
estimates are somewhat bigger than the OLS estimates, which is consistent with the pre-
treatment earnings dip observed in the data. The OLS treatment impacts for the pooled 
sample are 46, 38, and 31 percent 6, 12, and 18 months after the program. For the same 
reference periods, the treatment impacts for those attending high-quality courses are 54, 
43, and 47 percent, while for those attending low-quality courses are 36, 26, and 19 
percent. All these OLS treatment impacts are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. These estimates corroborate the evidence of the strong effect of training quality on 
the earnings of program participants and are also consistent with the previous findings 
about the large drop in the medium-term earnings of beneficiaries attending low-quality 
courses.  
8.2 Quality Dose versus Treatment Dose 
  The estimates for the returns to training quality may also be interpreted as returns 
to treatment dose rather than quality dose, because of differences in the duration of the 
on-the-job training experience among trainees. If this is true, it may hamper the causal 
relationship we have been testing in this paper. To address this potentially confounding 
factor, we use two different approaches. First, we check whether individuals enrolled in 
high-quality courses have larger treatment doses than individuals enrolled in low-quality 
courses. Using the pooled sample, we find a slight difference in favor of individuals 
attending low-quality courses. Over 98 percent of trainees enrolled in both low- and high-
quality courses complete at least the first stage of the program, whereas 67 and 63 percent 
complete at least a month out of the three months of on-the-job training experience.  
  Table 7 presents a second, more stringent test. We estimate average treatment 
impacts on the treated by using both matching and OLS methods applied to the subset of 
individuals who complete the training course at the training center location but do not 
participate in the paid, on-the-job training experience. In this way, we hold fixed the 
treatment dose and, at the same time, we eliminate any potential effects arising from 
differences among manufacturing firms that may mask the causal effect of the training 
quality. Each row describes a different parameter of interest and each column refers to 
impacts six, 12, and 18 months after the program.  
  Two patterns emerge. First, the treatment impacts for the formal training are 
positive although much smaller with respect to the overall mean program impacts. In fact,   27
the returns to formal training, particularly those emerging from the OLS estimation, are 
modest and consistent with previous findings reported in the literature on training 
programs (Heckman et al. 1999). Second, the treatment impacts are much larger for those 
beneficiaries attending high-quality courses within the group that complete only formal 
training. For instance, half a year after the program, the matching (OLS) treatment 
impacts for individuals attending high- and low-quality courses are 49 (29) and 3 (-20) 
percent, respectively. These estimates, however, are not statistically significant.  
Taken together, the estimates in Tables 4 and 7 impart two related lessons. First, 
the on-the-job training experience matters in terms of both magnitude and statistical 
significance of the point estimates. When comparing the impacts for those who 
completed only the first stage of the program (Row 1 in Table 7) with the overall impacts 
(Column 7 of Table 4), we observe large differences that suggest that formal training 
alone is not worth the cost. Second, the earnings differentials between people attending 
high- and low-quality courses are higher for the subsample of individuals who participate 
only in the first stage as compared to those for the whole sample. This suggests that the 
on-the-job training experience has the ability to smooth the strong training quality effects 
on labor earnings across individuals attending low- and high-quality courses.    
8.3 The Gender Dimension 
  Columns 9 and 10 of Table 2 show a potential damaging effect for the 
identification of the training quality returns: a disproportional number of males attend 
high-quality courses. Thus, the returns to training quality may not follow from gains in 
productivity but from intrinsic labor-market returns to males’ work. To purge this 
confounding factor from our estimates, we re-estimate both the difference-in-differences 
matching and OLS estimators separately for males and females by using the pooled data. 
  Three basic patterns emerge from Table 8. First, the large overall treatment effects 
found in the PROJOVEN program are driven by the performance of female participants.  
They show large and statistitically significant effects in both the short-run and the 
medium-term. In contrast, the male participants show positive but smaller effects in the 
short-run and no effects in the medium-term. Second, the returns to training quality are 
again positive and statistically significant when looking only the estimates emerging from 
the female subsample. We observe that the OLS average treatment impacts for females 
attending high-quality courses are 87, 90, and 97 percent after six, 12, and 18 months of   28
participation in the program. In contrast, the treatment gains for males are smaller and not 
statistically significant, although we still observe important differences between males 
attending high- and low-quality courses. The large number of female participants who 
moves from unproductive jobs toward productive ones explains these striking 
differences. In fact, 43 percent of female participants were working as either unpaid 
family workers or housekeepers before the program. This number reduces to 10 percent 6 
months after the program. In contrast, only 19 and 3.5 percent of males hold these types 
of jobs before and after the program, respectively. Finally, the point estimates from our 
matching estimators do not differ substantially from the corresponding OLS estimates, 
which indicate that the treatment impacts reported in this paper are robust to alternative 
identifying assumptions.   
9. Conclusions  
  The adoption of market-based approaches that ensure both quality and relevance 
in the provision of training services has been shown to effectively increase the earnings 
of disadvantaged young individuals, who frequently emerge from public schools 
operating far from any efficient frontier. The overall mean gains are mainly explained by 
the ability of the program to relocate individuals from unproductive jobs to productive 
ones in firms protected by international laws that guarantee minimum work conditions. 
The size of the point estimates are heightened because the per capita expenditures on 
participants are not small relative to the deficits that this program is being asked to 
address.  
   We also find strong heterogeneity of the treatment impacts by considering the 
quality of the training services. Individuals attending high-quality training courses show 
much higher impacts than those attending low-quality courses. The fact that the 
distribution of types of jobs between individuals attending high and low-quality courses 
is similar before and after the program suggests that some productivity-enhanced effects 
of high-quality training may explain the marginal gains.  
  This entire set of positive average and marginal training impacts is largely driven 
by the performance of female beneficiaries, who demonstrate much larger treatment 
effects than male participants. In addition, these earning differentials are larger in the 
medium-term than in the short-run, which is explained by a sharp drop in the medium-
term earnings of individuals attending low-quality services.    29
  This paper also shows that individuals who complete both the formal training and 
the on-the-job training experience have much higher earnings than individuals who 
complete only the formal training. In fact, the returns to the formal training are modest 
and consistent with the findings in the literature on training programs. In addition, the 
earnings differentials between people attending high- and low-quality courses are higher 
for the subsample of individuals who participate only in the first stage as compared to 
those for the whole sample. This result indicates that the second stage of the program, the 
on-the-job training experience, smooths productive gains between people attending 
training courses of varying quality. Thus, a policy implication that follows from this 
result is that on-the-job training experience may mitigate the outcomes of low-quality 
training services.  
This favorable assessment of the PROJOVEN program should be tempered by the 
existent trade-off between the costs and the potential coverage of this program. In fact, 
the large costs associated to this program prevent a large-scale expansion of its operations 
and thus the aggregate impact on the youth unemployment problem is very limited. 
Finally, the reader should bear in mind that the strong quality premiums observed in this 
paper are based on a sample of training institutions that pass a minimum quality threshold 
imposed by the program administrator. It is important to consider what the magnitude of 
these earnings differentials would be if training institutions located below the cut-off 
point were included. 
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Figure 1: Local Linear Regression



















6 months 12 months 18 months
 
Notes: Pooled data. Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth=0.20.  Dependent  
variable is soles (in real terms). The quality index is constructed by using first 
principal component of factor analytic methods. 
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Figure 3. Beneficiary Selection Process 
































Figure 4: Monthly Earnings for Pooled Data
































treated >=75th treated <75th control
 
           Note: Pooled means are unweighted. The quality index is constructed by  
           using first principal component of factor analytic methods.  35
  
 
Table 1. Standardized Scores for Multiple Quality Proxies 
Youth Training Program PROJOVEN, Lima 1996 to 2003 
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Market Knowledge 











        










        
# competing institutions  30  33  35  33  48 
# competing courses  154  158  215  204  363 
# funded courses  75  98  118  148  169 
Notes: The available bidding data have aggregate scores for each category.  These scores are normalized 
as the ratio of the difference between the raw indicator value and the minimum value divided by the 
range. All normalized proxies are between 0 and 1. The quality index is constructed by principal 
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cohort 1 cohort 2 cohort 3 cohort 4 cohort 5
treated  comparison  treated >50th  treated <50th 
A. Socio-Demographic
age 19.67 19.73 0.02 0.51 0.22 0.92 0.84 19.69 19.64
sex (%) 42.70 42.60 0.93 0.97 0.91 0.88 0.94 46.00 40.00
schooling (%)
   none 0.23 0.25 0.08 0.31 0.97 0.31 ---- 0.12 0.34
   incomplete primary 1.04 0.69 0.26 0.16 0.96 0.77 1.00 0.60 1.49
   complete primary 4.82 6.27 0.38 0.22 0.29 0.46 0.85 4.64 5.05
   incomplete high school 8.76 8.00 0.97 0.57 0.98 0.77 0.87 7.62 9.87
   complete high school  85.14 84.70 0.53 0.92 0.88 0.79 1.00 87.02 83.24
marital status (%)
   single 91.19 77.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 92.02 90.38
   married and/or cohabitating 5.12 14.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.24 5.27
   other 3. 69 8.79 0.56 0.65 0.14 1.00 0.25 2.76 4.35
have children (% ) 14.66 25.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.61 16.00
number of children 1.21 1.28 0.71 0.28 0.21 0.42 0.12 1.18 1.24
B. Labor information
work status (%)
   have a job 52.17 52.11 0.54 0.84 0.88 0.94 0.94 54.52 50.00
   unemployed 25.80 26.58 0.36 0.98 0.9 1.00 0.87 23.57 27.84
   out of labor force 22.03 21.30 0.16 0.82 0.96 0.93 0.92 21.90 22.45
kind of work (%)
   self-employed 19.89 21.04 0.59 0.22 0.28 0.41 0.88 19.00 20.74
   worker in private sector 53.67 62.23 0.00 0.71 0.98 0.42 0.03 55.46 51.18
   worker in public sector 0.66 0.88 0.31 0.56 0.14 0.16 0.56 0.66 0.67
   unpaid family worker 17.67 10.24 0.00 0.12 0.63 0.00 0.00 17.03 18.66
   housekeeper 7.33 5.29 0.47 0.15 0.03 0.30 0.02 7.21 7.60
monthly earnings 91.54 126.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 99.34 83.40
experience 2.88 2.71 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.67 ---- 2.84 2.93
participation in training courses 23.03 23.00 0.37 0.32 0.02 0.03 0.00 24.70 21.50
hours of training 56.87 56.02 0.51 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.00 57.40 57.03
C. Household characteristics
number of persons 6.23 6.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.10 0.28 6.26 6.22
household income  828.00 959.00 ---- ---- 0.12 0.00 0.00 894.31 767.45
number of bedrooms 2.09 2.15 0.00 0.37 0.24 0.31 0.04 2.15 2.03
household density rate 3.12 2.87 0.05 0.90 0.00 0.72 0.00 3.10 3.13
floor: earthen  65.04 72.02 0.00 0.84 0.03 0.87 0.04 65.92 61.00
ceiling: concrete 35.07 23.98 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.13 35.85
walls: concrete/bricks 67.03 62.33 0.11 0.91 0.34 0.01 0.19 67.33 66.55
water: piped into the home 72.57 60.22 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.11 ---- 73.28 72.04
water sewage: flush toilet 65.95 61.28 0.00 0.33 0.15 0.01 0.10 65.87 65.95
D. Parent's schooling
father (%)
   none 2.10 1.94    ------ 0.77 0.87 0.13 0.59 2.46 1.66
   primary 37.52 32.78    ------ 0.63 0.35 0.35 0.00 37.77 37.76
   incomplete high school 20.76 20.51    ------ 0.24 0.48 0.86 0.78 21.71 20.06
   complete high school 26.72 32.22    ------ 0.77 0.94 0.00 0.00 26.77 26.83
   higher education 7.57 5.20    ------ 0.29 0.37 0.01 0.29 6.37 8.85
mother (%)
   none 9.05 7.69    ------ 0.39 0.16 0.59 0.01 9.99 8.16
   primary 47.27 41.93    ------ 0.89 0.04 0.00 0.34 47.90 47.16
   incomplete high school 18.86 19.75    ------ 0.03 0.68 0.01 0.31 19.10 18.95
   complete high school 18.09 21.90    ------ 0.82 0.69 0.00 0.07 16.79 19.36
   higher education 3.72 3.19    ------ 0.41 0.97 0.00 0.80 3.47 4.01
# 1725 1742 599 627 720 732 764 840 873
Notes: Pooled means are unweighted. There are some observations with missing information for some covariates and thus the means are not based on the same number of 
observations. p-values refers to the test for differences in means for the treatment and comparison samples. 
p-value
Pooled data Quality Index
Table 2: Summary Statistics
PROJOVEN, Lima 1996-2003   37
covariates cohort 1 cohort 2 cohort 3 cohort 4 cohort 5
A. Socio-demographic
constant -1.49 0.02 6.67 1.82 -0.20
age 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.06**
sex  -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.23**
schooling 
   none ----- -0.44 -0.52 ---- ----
   incomplete primary 1.53** ---- -0.87 ---- ----
   complete primary ---- -0.20 -0.65** 0.17 -1.09
   incomplete high school 0.37 ---- ---- 0.71 -0.88
   complete high school  0.13 -0.13 -0.22 0.36 -1.11*
marital status 
   single 0.26 0.62 -5.67** -0.25 -0.56
   married and/or cohabitating -0.69 -0.06 -6.47** -0.53 -1.12**
have children  -0.23 -0.02 -0.12 -0.35 0.38
number of children 0.05 -0.44 -0.01 -0.09 -0.68
B. Labor information
work status 
   have a job -0.20 -0.51 -1.05** -0.14 0.47
   unemployed -0.45** -0.04 -0.19 0.01 -0.16
kind of work 
   self-employed 0.38 1.23** 0.95** 0.62 -0.60
   worker in private sector 0.18 1.04** 1.15** 0.63** -0.88
   worker in public sector 0.26 1.99* ---- ---- -0.97
   unpaid family worker 1.56** 0.74** 0.97** 0.72** 0.57
   housekeeper 0.27 0.63 1.89** 0.92** -0.15
monthly earnings -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 0.00
experience 0.03 0.34** 0.16** 0.10** ----
participation in training courses -0.80** 0.34 -0.55** 0.20 0.25
hours of training 0.00** -0.00** 0.00** 0.00 -0.00**
C. Household characteristics
number of persons 0.06** -0.05** -0.25** 0.02 0.02
household income  ---- ---- ---- -0.00* -0.00**
number of rooms/ number of persons 0.06* 0.01 0.09** 0.00 0.16**
participation in welfare programs 0.14 ---- ---- ---- ----
floor : earthen 1.00** 0.31** -0.11 -0.04 0.09
ceiling
   concrete 0.86** 0.01 0.36** 0.26** -0.39
matting ---- -0.12 0.09 0.35** -0.27**
walls: concrete /brick -0.71** 0.15 -0.09 0.17 0.03
water: piped into the home   0.52** 0.81** 0.28** ---- ----
water sewage: flush toilet  -0.24* -0.55* -0.38** 0.27** 0.28**
D. Parent's schooling
father
   no information ---- ---- 0.63 -0.63 ----
   none ---- ---- ---- -0.25 -0.09
   primary ---- -0.27 0.20 -0.42 0.31
   incomplete high school ---- -0.02 -0.07 -0.36 0.24
   complete high school ---- -0.17 0.00 -0.46* 0.09
   higher education ---- -0.01 0.16 ---- 0.49
mother
   no information ---- ---- -1.43** ---- ----
   none ---- 0.70** -0.30 -0.79** 0.74
   primary ---- 0.30 -0.18 -0.65* 0.33
   incomplete high school ---- 0.72** 0.00 -1.14** 0.17
   complete high school ---- 0.78** -0.11 -1.19** 0.27
   higher education ---- 0.18 0.22 ---- 0.29
# 585 604 679 690 705
R
2  0.34 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.17
Note: * statistically significant at 5 percent, ** statistically significant at 10 percent. The specification of each probit model follows 
Dahejia and Wahba’s (1999) balancing test. Not all covariates are observed for all cohorts. 
Table 3: Coefficient Estimates from Balanced Probit Models for Program Participation
PROJOVEN, Lima 1996-2003
Coefficients
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                                              Table 4. Average Treatment Impacts on Monthly Earnings 
Difference-in-Differences Local Linear Matching Estimator 
PROJOVEN, Lima 1996 to 2003 
 
  Cohort 1  Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5  Pooled Data 
A. 6 months after program  










67 (16)  
[59] 
           












           












           
B. 12 months after program  












           












           












           
C. 18 months after program 








---- 44  (22) 
[39] 
           








----  68 (35)  
[60] 
           








---- 27(48)   
[24] 
           
Notes: Point estimates are in real soles. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications are in parentheses. 
Percentage gains with respect to earnings in the baseline period are in brackets.  q4 and q1 are the top and bottom quartiles 
of the quality index distribution. The propensity scores are estimated using a probit model. Difference-in-differences 
matching is applied to the sample of individuals inside the overlapping support region. The matching variable is the log of 
the odd-ratio. We use Epanechnikov kernel function with the bandwidths determined by weighted cross-validation. Pooled 
data estimates are based on the propensity scores from individual cohort estimates. The optimal bandwidths for the pooled 
data are 1.3, 1.3, and 1.2 when estimating the treatment impacts 6, 12, and 18 months after the program, respectively. 
These data include 1,541, 1,453, and 1,118 observations in the comparison group and 1,436, 1,407, and 1,031 observations 
in the treatment group. In the fourth quartile, there are 347, 336, and 264 observations 6, 12, and 18 months after the 
program. In the first quartile there are 364, 362, and 224 observations, respectively.     39
  
Table 5. Marginal Treatment Impacts on Monthly Earnings 
Difference-in-Differences Local Linear Matching Estimator 
PROJOVEN, Lima 1996 to 2003 
 
  Cohort 1  Cohort 2 Cohort 3  Cohort 4 Cohort 5  Pooled Data 
A. 6 months after program  












         












         
B. 12 months after program 












         












         
C. 18 months after program 








---- 36  (37) 
[32] 
         








---- 38  (41) 
[34] 
         
Notes: Point estimates are in real soles. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications are in parentheses. 
Percentage gains with respect to earnings in the baseline period are in brackets.  4 q ,  3 q , and  1 q are the fourth, third, and 
first quartiles of the quality index distribution. The propensity scores are estimated using a probit model. The matching 
variable is the log of the odd-ratio. Difference-in-differences matching is applied to the sample of individuals inside the 
overlapping support region. Pooled data estimates are based on the propensity scores from individual cohort estimates. We 
use Epanechnikov kernel function with the bandwidths determined by weighted cross-validation. The optimal bandwidths 
for the pooled data are 2.7, 5, and 1.2 when estimating the treatment impacts 6, 12, and 18 months after the program, 
respectively. These data include 369, 358, and 265 observations in the fourth quartile; 339, 332, and 253 observations in 
the third quartile; and 359, 358, and 261 observations in the first quartile.  
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Table 6. Treatment Impacts on Monthly Earnings 
Parametric Least Square Estimator 
 PROJOVEN, Lima 1996 to 2003 
 
 
  Treatment Impacts for Pooled data 
 6  months 
after program 
12 months 
after program  
 18  months 
after program 
        
        




 35  (13) 
[31] 
        




 52  (18) 
[47] 
        




 23  (18) 
[19] 
        
Notes: Point estimates are in real soles. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications are in 
parentheses. Percentage gains with respect to earnings in the baseline period are in brackets. The estimator is 
applied to the sample of individuals inside the overlapping support region.  4 q and  1 q are the fourth and bottom 
quartiles of the quality index. The parametric specification includes as regressors age, education, sex, marital 
status, pre-treatment earnings, whether has children, number of children, whether participate in previous 
training, household’ density rate, floor, ceiling, and walls house characteristics, access to flush toilet, and the 
estimated propensity score. Also, it considers dummy variables for having attended a course in the fourth, 
third, second, and first quartile of the quality distribution. The control group indicator is the omitted group. 
There are 1,539, 1,453 and 1,118 observations in the comparison group 6, 12, and 18 months after the 
program; and 1,436, 1,407, and 1,031 observations in the treatment group, respectively.  In the fourth quartile, 
there are 347, 336, and 244 observations for the same reference periods. In the first quartile, there are 364, 
362, and 224 observations for the same reference periods.    41
Table 7. Average Treatment Impacts on Monthly Earnings for Formal Training   
Difference-in-Differences Local Linear Matching Estimator 
PROJOVEN, Lima 1996 to 2003 
 
 
  Treatment Impacts for Pooled data 
 6  months 
after program 
12 months 
after program  
 18  months 
after program 
        
10 () ( 0 ) Yq Y Δ= −         




 31  (29) 
[28] 
        




 21  (15) 
[19] 
        
14 0 () ( 0 ) Yq Y Δ= −         




 59  (40) 
[53] 
        




 37  (24) 
[33] 
        
11 0 () ( 0 ) Yq Y Δ= −         




 45  (73) 
[40] 
        




 32  (27) 
[28] 
        
Notes: Point estimates are in real soles. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications are in 
parentheses. Percentage gains with respect to earnings in the baseline period are in brackets. Both difference-
in-differences matching and OLS estimates are applied to the sample of individuals inside the overlapping 
support region. q4   and q1  are the top and bottom quartiles of the quality index distribution within the 
subsample of individuals that complete the formal training. The parametric specification includes as 
regressors age, education, sex, marital status, pre-treatment earnings, whether has children, number of 
children, whether participate in previous training, household’ density rate, house infrastructure (floor, ceiling, 
and walls), whether has access to flush toilet, and the estimated propensity score. Also, it considers dummy 
variables for having attended a course in the fourth, third, second, and first quartile of the quality distribution. 
The control group indicator is the omitted group. We use Epanechnikov kernel function for the matching 
estimates with the bandwidths determined by weighted cross-validation. The optimal bandwidths are 1.3, 2.5, 
and 2.6 when estimating treatment impacts 6, 12, and 18 months after the program. The matching variable is 
the log of the odd ratio. There are 1,547, 1,453, and 1,118 observations in the control group 6, 12, and 18 
months after the program, and 577, 566, and 429 observations in the treatment group, respectively.  
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Table 8. Treatment Impacts on Monthly Earnings by Gender    
Matching and OLS Estimators 
PROJOVEN, Lima 1996 to 2003 
 
. 
  Treatment Impacts for Pooled Data 
 6  months 





 male  female male  Female Male  female
           
10 () ( 0 ) Yq Y Δ= −            












                












            
14 0 () ( 0 ) Yq Y Δ= −            












            












            
11 0 () ( 0 ) Yq Y Δ= −            












           












           
 Notes:  Pooled data estimates from males and females sub-samples. Point estimates are in real soles. 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications are in parentheses. Percentage gains with respect to 
earnings in the baseline period are in brackets. Both difference-in-differences matching and OLS estimates 
are applied to the sample of individuals inside the overlapping support region. q4  and q1 are the top and 
bottom quartiles of the quality index distribution. The parametric specification includes as regressors age, 
education, sex, marital status, pre-treatment earnings, whether has children, number of children, whether 
participate in previous training, household’ density rate, house infrastructure (floor, ceiling, and walls), 
whether  have access to flush toilet, and the estimated propensity score. Also, it considers dummy variables 
for having attended a course in the fourth, third, second, and first quartile of the quality distribution. The 
control group indicator is the omitted group. We use Epanechnikov kernel function for the matching estimates 
with the bandwidths determined by weighted cross-validation. The optimal bandwidths are 3.4, 3.4, and 1 
when estimating treatment impacts for the male subsample 6, 12, and 18 months after the program; and 1.2, 
5.2, and 4.2 for the female subsample, respectively. The matching variable is the log of the odd ratio.  There 
are 675, 621, and 478 comparison observations, and 668, 604, and 439 treated observations for the male 
subsample 6, 12, and 18 months after the program, respectively. There are 884, 832, and 640 comparison 
observations, and 812, 803, and 592 treated observations for the female subsample 6, 12, and 18 months after 
the program.  
      
 
 